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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MARILYN B. CALAHAN,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
Case No.

vs.

11552

KAY LAUREL WOOD,
Defendant and Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant has recited facts which she, or her Attorney, hoped the jury would believe. However, considering the facts which the jury had a right to find,
and did, they are as follows :
In the early morning hour::; of December 6, 1966, a
cold, ''very foggy" morning, the Plaintiff, a cocktail
waitress at Chris' Tavern up Ogden Canyon, left her
work and was being given a ride by a customer to Ogden.
The car wouldn't start, and was pu::;hed down the canyon
by a second car, about one mile, but without success.
Both cars stopped, squarely in the center of the
west bound lane, with the left side of the cars 1 foot 7
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inches from the diYiding white line svparating the ea~t
bound and \H'st bound lant>s. (T-3± - officer) There wer(·
no lights on the can;. ( rr-85; T-88) rl'he of ficn, driving
opposite bonnd h:v coincidvnce inmwcliately aftPr the accident sa\v no lights at all. ('L'-:29) 'l'he men in tlit• two
vehicles had all alightl>cl from the cars 5 to 10 minutr·,
befor0 the accident. ( '1'-GG) rrhey had no flashlighb.
Tlwr0 was amplv room to park on the north should(·J,
(T-89) and in fact, the officer parked hi:s car on the
shoulder completely off the travel portion. ('r-30)
The Plaintiff knew the car was blocking the road
(T-GG); that it was fogg~-; that the :situation wa:s dangerous, but electPd to remain in the car becau:se she wa~
cold. (T-68)
The Defendant, driving west dmrn tlw canyon at a
speed of about 20 m.p.h. suddenly struck the unlighted '
vehicles, which he had not previou:sly :seen because of fog
and darkness.

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE DEFENSES OF ASSUMPTION OF RISK
AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE WERE PROPERLY SUBMITTED TO THE JURY.

\Ve reply to Appellant's Points One and 'l'!uee '
simultaneously.

In Fergu:;un v:;. Ju·ng:;ma, 10 Ut. 2d, 179, 350 P21l
404, this Court stated:
"To evaluate tlw:se instructions a clear under-

standi~g of the difference between assumption of '
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risk and contributory rn~gligence is necessary.
'I'hese. terms are often used interchangeably;
sometuues both are used when only one is applicable, and often the term assumption of risk
is used when there is a total lack of evidence to
support a finding that Plaintiff's recovery is barred by that doctrine and under some fact situations both assumption of risk and contributory
negligence would bar recovery. If the instruction
is based on a factual situation which would support a finding of contributory negligence but the
instruction erroneously called it assumption of
risk, this alone would not be prejudicial error.
Contributory negligence is based on carelessness, inadvertance and unintended events, but assmnption of risk requires an intelligent and deliberate choice to assume a known risk. Assumption of risk requires knowledge by Plaintiff of a
specific defect or dangerous condition caused by
Defendant's negligence or lack of due care which
Plaintiff could have, but voluntarily and deliberately failed to avoid and thereby assumed the
risk of the injuries he sustained. On the other
hand, contributory negligence requires evidence
only that Plaintiff failed to use the care for his
own safety which an ordinary, reasonable and
prudent person would use under the existing circumstances.
Under both the doctrine of contributory negligence and assumption of risk, whether the Plaintiff failed to use due care for his own safety or
he deliberately assumed the risk of injury in the
face of known danger, was a jury question, unless
the evidence was so conclusive on those questions
that a finding otherwise would be unreasonable
and so require a finding against Plaintiff as a
matter of law."
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It was conkrnkd by Dd"emlant that Plaintiff
(1) Assumed the risk of injnr:• to hen;('Jf h:· kn(J\I

ingi_\' accepting a dangerous condition, which she could
have aniided b:- the sirnplP act of !Paving tlw stow(·d
car, and
(2) That shl' \ms ('Ontrihutoril:· 1wglige11t for n11t
t'XPrcising that d!•gn•e of care fur her ou:u safety that a
rt>asonahle and prudent pen;on undl'l' thl' same circumstances would have exercised.

In this respect, Plaintiff had am11lc time to object
to the> driver parking the car in the traffic lane-wliiC'I:
she did not.
In Balle vs. Smith, 81Utah179, 17 P2d 22-1:
"A guest is required to exl•rcise the same can
for his own safety that a reasonable and prudent
person would exercise under the same circumstances."
In GOA C.J.S. Sec. 329 Motor Vehicles, Pg. 3G-l:, thl'
text states:
"The common-law duty to exercise reasonable
and prudent care is not nullified by statutory regulations with respect to parking which are regarded as cumulative requirements, and thP failure to exercise such care may constitnk negligence notwithstanding compliance with the rPf,rnlations, since precautionary measures oth<'r tha 1
those specified may sometimes be necessary.
1

The test of negligPnce of a motorist parking
or leaving his vehicle standing in the highway 1~
whether he exerC'ised i-mch care as a r<'asonabh
prudent person would exercise in the same cir-
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wm:-itances and it is not required that the driver
shall have exercised extraordinary care. Ordinari1)·, the operator of the :-itovped vehicle has the
right to assume that other vehicles using the high\rny \\·ill exercise reasonabl~ care in keeping a
lookout and in passing; but it has been held that
he may not assume, so as to shield himself from
liability that another motorist would discover his
negligt•11ce and by discovering, be able to avoid it,
and, where existing conditions are such as to affrct vision it may not be assumed that an approaching vehicle will maintain its course on the
left side of the highway."
Jf tlten Uw drivt'r of Plaintiff's vehicle was negligent in the manner and place he parked his unlighted
car, would not the Plaintiff be negligent for acquiescing
in that negligence without rn·otesU Would she be justifiPd in a:-;:-;uming other motorists would discover the
danger in time to avoid injury to her, when the driver
would not he so justified~
Certainly Plaintiff's driver was negligent for violating the Provisions of 41-G-101, U.C.A. 1953 which
states:
"Upon any highway outside of a business or
n·:-iidence district no person shall stop, park, or
leave standing any vehicle, whether attended or
unattended, upon the paved or main traveled part
of the highway when it is practical to stop, park,
or so leave :-ouch vehicle off such part of said highwa!·, bnt in every event an unobstructed width of
the highway opposite a standing vehicle shall be
l<>ft for thP free passage of other vehicles and a
dear viPw of such stopped vehick' shall be availab!P from a distance of 200 feet in each direction
upon such hig·hway."
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Plaintiff may not plead ignorance of the law, even
though she was in fact, not the driver.
However, aside from the statute, she knew the ear
was parked without lights, blocking the only \Yest bound
lane of a canyon road, in heavy fog. 'l'he car wa~ ~o
parked for 5 to 10 minutes-ample time to object, to
leave the car, and there was ample shoulder for the car
to park on off the travel portion of the road, as did the
Highway Patrol officer.
61 C.J.S., Sec. 491, Pg. 116, Motor Y ehicles:
"If an occupant of a motor vehicle knows, or
in the exercise of ordinary care should know, that
to remain in the vehicle is dangerous, and if under
the same or similar circumstances a reasonably
prudent person would leave or withdraw from
the vehicle, he is guilty of contributory negligence,
if, a reasonable opportunity therefore being of.
forded, he fails to do so, and such failure contributes proximately to cause his injury.

See also Eserina vs. Overland J.lioving Co. (1949) 15
Utah 519, 206 P2d 621.
POINT TWO
THE JURY DID NOT FIND THE ACCIDENT
"UNAVOIDABLE" AND THE APPELLANT'S OBJECTION TO AN INSTRUCTION THEREON IS
MOOT.

The jury by Special Interrogatories found:
(l) Defendant was IH'gligent for not keeping a
proper lookout.
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(:2) 'L'he Plaintiff was contributory negligent for re-

maining in the vehicle nnder the circumstances.

Obviousl,\r, th('refon•, tlwy did not find that the accident was uua voidable.
rL'lw instrnctiun tlwreon could hardly be prejudicial,
1•ren if \V(~ asstlllH' AIJ]Jellant conect in Point Two of her

Brief.

111 3 Am ..J ur. 2d,

~ee. ~03,

Pg. 2-1 I, the text states:

"The admission of erroneous evidence and
erroneous instructions based thereon, are rendered harmless or cured where the jury verdict is
sueh that the evidence becomes immaterial. And
error in the admission of evidence is cured where
the verdict shows that the evidence was rejected
by the jury."
See also Sec. 792.

'---

/1£y" c

7(/

Here, the jury ·1~ the defrnse of unavoidable
accident.

.

If we assmne the r:l'rial Court erred in allowing that

defense, the error was

e--vtl cl)

~ 1:Jy

.

the verdict.

It has long since been established in Utah that the

erroneous admission of evidence on an issue found for
the party comvlaining is harmless.
Smith vs. (}ilbert, 49 Ut. 510, 164 P. 1026.
Uarr vs. Cranney, 25 Utah 193, 70 P. 853.

7

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

See also 5A C.J.S., Appeal & Error, Sec. 1736.
Respectfully submitted,

L. E. MIDGLEY
Attorney for RespondentDefendant
702 El Paso Natural Gas Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah
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